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1. Introduction
The common view in the academic literature is that firms hedge to reduce cash flow
variability, which is costly to the firm because of capital market imperfections such as agency
costs, financial distress, and underinvestment (e.g. Stulz, 1984, Smith and Stulz, 1985, Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993). Textbook discussions of risk management similarly stress that
hedging to reduce variability can make sense if it reduces the chance of cash shortfalls or financial
distress (e.g. Brealey, Myers, and Allen, 2014; Berk and DeMarzo, 2014). The most commonly
discussed force that can offset firms’ incentives to reduce variability, especially for small firms, is
fixed costs of running a risk management program (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Géczy,
Minton, and Schrand, 1997).1
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that these explanations for corporate hedging may
not be complete. Observed patterns in derivatives use are consistent with some of these rationales,
but to different degrees and in different settings.2 In addition, there is the somewhat puzzling
evidence about the predicted positive relationship between hedging and firm value. Commoditybased firms that manage their price risk do not have higher valuations than unhedged firms
(Tufano, 1996, and Jin and Jorion, 2006) and there is mixed empirical evidence on the association
between currency hedging and firm value (Allayannis and Weston, 2001 and Guay and Kothari,
2003).
Motivated by these partial explanations and puzzles, we propose that a missing variable in
the risk management theories could be a clientele effect associated with exposure to the firm’s
underlying industry risk factor (i.e., being a “pure play” stock). When firms hedge the variability

1

A recent exception is Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2014) who discuss collateral constraints as a mitigating force
in risk management activities.
2
For FX derivatives in particular, the Géczy et al. (1997) model predicts just over 70% of hedgers accurately.
2

that can negatively impact the firm’s investing and financing choices, they also may be hedging
away an exposure that investors want. Our proposition that institutional preferences for pure play
stocks could be an important variable in firms’ risk management decisions rests on two important
assumptions. The first is that institutions systematically invest in stocks with exposure to an
industry risk factor, and the second is that firms value institutional ownership, either for its
monitoring or liquidity benefits (Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). If the benefits that come from
catering to these institutional investors are large enough, they could be an offsetting force that
warrants not hedging.
We take as given the second assumption that firms might value institutional ownership
enough that it could be a relevant factor in their risk management decisions. This supposition is
based on insights from several areas of existing evidence. Studies show an association between
liquidity and the cost of capital (e.g., Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman, 2001; Chan, 2002;
Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; and Wang, 2003), which provides a
rationale for firms to value the liquidity provided from increased institutional ownership. In
addition, studies suggest that firms cater to institutional preferences in other real activities
including dividend policy and exchange listing (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Doidge, Karolyi
and Stulz, 2004).3 Finally, firms engage in costly activities intended to attract institutional
investors, such as investor conferences, suggesting that they view institutional ownership as
valuable.

3

Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers consider the attractiveness of their stock to investors when making
hedging choices. In an interview in 2002, Robert McEwen, chief executive of Goldcorp, stated: “Being number one
and ultimate gold stock are not the same. So what is the ultimate gold stock? Low risk; superior assets; very profitable
business; leverage to gold; a strong board and management group; and excellent growth prospects. We are North
American based, we have no debt, we are not hedged, a quarter billion dollars in cash at the end of the first half.”
(emphasis added) McEwen (2002)
3

We cannot, however, take as given the first assumption that institutions systematically
invest in stocks with exposure to an industry risk factor. Whether and when institutions invest in
pure play stocks is an open empirical question.4
Our goal is to address this question by characterizing institutions' investments in stocks
that maintain high within-industry exposure to the underlying industry risk factor (“pure play”
stocks) on average and across different industries, institution types, and through time. Our
selection of characteristics to analyze is guided by commonly observed features of the institutional
investment process that shape institutions’ holdings decisions. These features include contractual
arrangements in the delegated asset management industry that regularly include industry
performance benchmarks and concentrations of information expertise about industry sectors. The
idea that institutions would display preferences for exposure is generally intuitive given these
features of the industry.5 We seek to understand the phenomenon in a more precise way.
We analyze two measures of institutional investments in pure play stocks. The first is the
number of owners of a firm’s stock. The second is the degree to which institutions tilt their
portfolios toward (away from) high exposure (low exposure) stocks. Our primary measure of
within-industry exposure is derived from a two-factor market model that includes an industryfactor, estimated annually within the Fama-French 30 industries.
We document robust evidence that institutions systematically invest in pure play stocks.
Pure play stocks have 35% more institutional investors, on average, than low-exposure stocks after
controlling for other previously identified determinants of institutional ownership, and institutions

Investors’ preferences for intra-industry exposure are distinct from previously documented preferences for particular
industries (e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005). Not all “gold” stocks, for example, have the same degree of
exposure to gold price risk due to differences in their underlying operations or hedging policies.
5
In fact, the existence of the BUGS index (Basket of Unhedged Gold Stocks) provides anecdotal evidence that
investors have preferences for industry exposures, at least within the gold industry.
4
4

tilt their portfolios toward pure play stocks, overweighting (underweighting) high-exposure (lowexposure stocks) by 138 (142) basis points (bps) on average relative to the stock’s value-weighted
share in the industry portfolio. Investments in pure play stocks are strongest following periods of
favorable industry news, with overweighting almost twice as large relative to periods following
less favorable news. Pure play stock investments are concentrated in industries in which industry
returns explain a large fraction of firm-level returns relative to the market (“high homogeneity
industries” including utilities, mining, tobacco, crude oil/natural gas, and coal).

In high

homogeneity industries, institutions overweight high-exposure (underweight low-exposure) stocks
by 388 (601) bps. We find little evidence of preferences for industry exposure in low homogeneity
industries (i.e., wholesale, services, games, fabricated products, and electrical equipment).
While all institutions invest in pure play stocks, the strength of the association varies by
institution type. We categorize institutions using two classification schemes. The first is the
groupings specified by Thompson Financial: banks, insurance companies, investment advisors,
and pensions/endowments. The second is the groupings based on observed trading activity
(Bushee, 1998): dedicated owners, quasi-indexers, and transient investors.6 Both classification
schemes help distinguish institutions based on whether their primary role is monitoring or
providing liquidity. We find that institutional investments in pure play stocks are strongest for
liquidity providers (e.g., investment advisors and transient investors) compared to institutions
often characterized as providing monitoring, and the liquidity providers’ preferences are strongest
in the high homogeneity industries.

6

We thank Brian Bushee for making the institution classification data available on his website:
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html Bushee (2011).
5

The salient factor in a firm’s risk management decision is not institutional ownership per
se but the economic benefit that the institutional ownership provides. Although the benefits of
institutional ownership could come from increased monitoring or increased liquidity in the firm’s
stock, we cannot measure the economic benefits of increased monitoring in a systematic fashion.
We can, however, estimate the association between liquidity and industry exposure, which is
useful given the previously documented finding that institutions classified as liquidity providers
show the strongest preferences for pure play stocks. We document that share turnover is 45%
higher (29% lower) for pure play (low exposure) stocks than for stocks with medium levels of
exposure, and price impact (Amihud, 2002) is 47% lower (61% higher) for pure play (low
exposure) stocks. These results suggest that the relation between exposure and liquidity is
measurable and economically meaningful.
We use a comprehensive sample and sample period. Our sample firms include all stocks
that are owned by at least one institution that files a 13F and that have Compustat and CRSP data
available, thus we cover a comprehensive set of publicly-traded firms. We conduct the analysis
over the years 1984 – 2006, a long period that can encompass variation in stock market trends
including periods of momentum and changes in the structure of the fund industry such as the
introduction of ETFs. We subject the analysis to multiple robustness tests. The findings are robust
to alternative measures of exposure and they are not explained by firm characteristics that are
potentially correlated with industry exposure including idiosyncratic risk, liquidity, firm size, and
financial reporting transparency.
One implication of our analyses is that a risk management program intended to reduce cash
flow variability also could hedge away industry exposure, which is desired by institutional
investors. We are not, however, proposing that this evidence implies that firms should hedge less,
6

or in the extreme, not hedge. We are proposing that firms should weigh the potential benefits of
increased institutional investment in the firm’s stock against the benefits that hedging can convey
by reducing cash flow variability. Our findings shed light on the industries that could see the
greatest increase in institutional investment by being a pure play stock, as well as when the
response could be greatest and from which types of institutions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses existing studies that connect to the
analysis. Section 3 describes the measurement of intra-industry exposure. Section 4 presents the
analysis of institutional ownership and of portfolio tilting, on average, including various robustness
tests. Section 5 presents evidence on the economic benefits of being a pure play stock. Section 6
provides cross-sectional evidence on which industries, periods of time and for which types of
institutions the investments in pure play stocks are more pronounced. Section 7 concludes.

2. Related literature
A fairly robust finding in the literature is that institutional investors make investment
decisions based on firm characteristics. Commonly accepted characteristics include market
capitalization (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Blume and Keim,
2014); “style” characteristics such as growth or value (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003); and dividend
policy (Del Guercio, 1996). A firm’s industry is another example. Industry concentration is
explained by institutions’ incentives to exploit information advantages (Kaperczyk, Sialm, and
Zheng, 2005). Yet, studies have not examined whether institutions make investment decisions
among firms within an industry based on a firm's exposure to the underlying industry factor.
One rationale for institutional investment in pure play stocks is the common practice in the
delegated asset management industry of including industry performance benchmarks in customer
7

contracts. In particular, for advisors of regulated assets (i.e., mutual funds), the SEC requires funds
to report performance relative to a broad-based benchmark, such as the S&P500, in the registration
statement (Form N1-A), and funds may report their performance relative to one or more other
indexes, such as an industry index. Performance benchmarking is voluntary outside regulated
funds, but moral hazard and adverse selection models predict benchmarking as an optimal choice
(e.g., Maug and Naik, 1996). Whether regulated or self-imposed, benchmarks could affect the
fund manager’s investment allocation decisions either directly though relative performance in
compensation contracts or indirectly because compensation is based on assets under management
and performance relative to a benchmark affects fund flows (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Sensoy,
2009).
At the same time, asset managers can have limits on the scale and scope of their
investments, including prohibitions against holding assets or trading financial instruments such as
derivatives. Given these trading constraints, which again can be regulated or self-imposed,7 a cost
effective way for institutions to meet their stated performance objectives is to invest in stocks that
are exposed to the relevant industry factors.
Our analysis also is guided by theories of endogenous information gathering. These
“learning” models predict that investors with greater information processing capacity (i.e., less
constrained) will engage in specialized information acquisition about common risk factors that
affect the payoffs to multiple risky assets (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2010). Having acquired the information, the investor subsequently allocates more

7

Mutual funds, in particular, are required to include in the registration statement their overall investment objective
and their strategy to achieve that objective. Funds are not required to list specific securities in which the fund can
invest, but they are required to report the extent to which the fund is permitted to undertake broad activities such as
borrowing, lending, and derivatives trading. See Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004) for a discussion of
regulation associated with investment constraints in the context of evaluating fund’s choices of investment restrictions.
8

wealth to the “learning” portfolio, trading off the benefits of more precise information about those
stocks’ future prospects with the resulting costs of under-diversification.
Industries are given as an example of a common factor that can convey an information
advantage. Firms within an industry are likely to have relatively homogeneous production and
cost functions, which increases the returns to learning about the industry because the underlying
industry exposure more directly maps into the firm’s stock performance (Jin and Jorion, 2006).
Evidence that a better understanding of an industry can lead to improved estimates of payoffs for
firms within the industry is provided by O’Brien (1990), who shows that investment analysts tend
to specialize in one industry, and Dunn and Nathan (2005), who show that analysts that focus on
one industry produce better forecasts than analysts focusing on multiple industries.
These rationales for institutions’ investment decisions guide us to examine three potential
sources of variation in institutions' investments in pure play stocks. First, we expect variation
across industries, with institutions investing in industries in which asset managers have customer
contracting arrangements subject to a performance benchmark. Sector funds and funds with
performance benchmarks will arise endogenously in industries in which specialized learning is
optimal. Second, we expect variation across time. The pressure to beat benchmarks is likely to
be strongest in industries with positive momentum. In addition, investors are more likely to exploit
the information advantage gained from specialized learning following favorable information.
Third, we expect variation across institution type. Institutions can vary in the degree to which their
customer contracts contain performance benchmarks. One might expect mutual fund managers,
particularly industry sector funds, to have the strongest benchmark-beating incentives. However,
if other institution types have greater information processing capacity (i.e., are less constrained),
the learning models would predict that these institutions will engage in specialized information
9

acquisition about common risk factors and allocate more wealth to the “learning” portfolio.
Ultimately, the association between institution type and investments in pure play stocks will
depend on the relationship between resources allocated to learning and the use of performance
benchmarking in contracting arrangements, and the possible correlation between the two forces.

3. Measuring industry exposure
For the various analyses in this paper, we measure the industry exposure of the stock of
each firm i at an annual frequency. Following Tufano (1998), we use daily returns data between
January 1st and December 31st each year y to estimate a two factor Dimson (1979) model:

ri ,t   i 

k 1

k 1

k 1

k 1

ind
 imkt
,k rmkt ,t  k    i ,k rind ,t  k  i ,t

(1)

where rmkt denotes the daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted market index, and rind denotes
the daily return on the appropriate equally-weighted industry portfolio. Industry exposure for firm
i in year y is:

 iyind   iind
,0 

1  1   2 ind
 i , y 1   iind
, y 1
1  2 1





where 1 and  2 are the autocorrelation coefficients of rind during the same year. We require at
least 60 daily return observations during year y to estimate industry exposure for a stock. Firms
are assigned to one of the Fama-French 30 industry categories using the definitions provided on
Kenneth French’s website.8 We consider alternative measures of industry exposure in sensitivity
analysis described in Section 4.3, including the use of a value-weighted index in eqn. (1). We

8

The 30th industry includes firms that do not fall into industries 1 to 29; we discard the small number of firms assigned
to the 30th industry.
We thank Kenneth French for making these data available on his website:
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
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present results based on using equally-weighted returns to ensure that the returns from a small
number of large companies do not overly influence our measure of industry returns, thereby
creating a potential mechanical association between firm size and the industry beta.9
The estimated coefficients, iyind , provide a continuous measure of firm i’s industry
exposure in year y. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for βind by industry. The average industry
exposure ranges from 0.52 for the Electrical Equipment industry to 0.93 for the Utilities industry
(column 1). Intra-industry standard deviations of βind range from 0.70 to 2.01 (column 2). These
patterns suggest we have sufficient intra-industry variation in industry exposure to detect investor
preferences for pure play stocks.
We also create two indicator variables to identify high and low exposure firms within each
industry. BETAHIGHiy equals one (BETALOWiy equals one) if iyind is above (below) the 70th (30th)
percentile industry exposure for stock i’s industry in year y.10 The within-industry measurement
of the variables controls for the possibility that investors are attracted to particular industries with
high average exposures and not to within-industry exposure. The indicator variables also allow us
to observe non-linearities in the relation between institutional ownership and a stock’s industry
exposure. We identify high and low exposure firms (BETAHIGH and BETALOW) before requiring
that the sample firms have non-missing COMPUSTAT data that are necessary in the subsequent
analysis, thus reducing potential selection bias. The resulting sample contains approximately
2,600 firm-year observations in each of the 23 years from 1984 through 2006.

9

The correlation between firm size measured by market capitalization and industry exposure in the full panel is 10%.
The mean log market capitalization is 5.33 for high exposure observations (upper 30%) compared to 4.75 for low
exposure observations (bottom 30%).
10
Henceforth, we drop the subscripts i and y from βind.
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We provide out-of-sample evidence that βind , which is based on historical data, predicts
future exposure, which is the variable of interest for investors making portfolio allocation
decisions. At the start of year y+1, we form an equally-weighted hedge portfolio for each industry
that goes long stocks classified as high exposure as of December 31 year y (BETAHIGH = 1) and
shorts stocks classified as low exposure (BETALOW = 1) as of December 31 year y. The portfolios
are rebalanced annually. We regress the returns from the portfolio on the excess returns from the
market portfolio and the relevant industry portfolio:

rhighexp  rlowexp     m rmkt  rf    ind rind  rf   

(2)

If βind, BETAHIGH, and BETALOW capture meaningful differences in industry exposure, then we
expect to observe  ind  0 . Table 1 column 3 shows that  ind  0 for all industries other than
Electrical equipment, Wholesale, and Books.

4. Empirical analysis of institutions’ investments in pure play stocks
We characterize investor preferences using two approaches. In the first, the unit of
observation is a firm-year. We examine the relation between industry exposure and the number of
institutions that hold a firm’s stock (“institutional ownership” tests). In the second, the unit of
analysis is an institution-year. We examine the extent of portfolio tilting toward pure play stocks
(“portfolio tilting” tests).

4.1 Model specifications
For the institutional ownership tests, we use the following model to estimate the association
between institutional ownership and industry exposure:
12

 

LNUMINSTiy      iyind    k CONTROLkiy   iy,

(3)

k

where LNUMINSTiy is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of institutions
investing in firm i in year y. The coefficient central to the analysis is . A significant positive
(negative) coefficient reflects attraction (aversion) to a stock’s industry exposure (βind). We
determine the count of institutions that hold a firm’s stock by aggregating data from the Thomson
Financial 13F database at the end of December each year. We assume that firms that are not
included in the reported holdings of any institutions on the Thomson Financial database have zero
institutional investors.11 We estimate eqn. (3) annually for each year between 1984 and 2006.
Standard errors in the annual regressions are clustered by industry.
The model includes a total of 15 control variables (CONTROL). Appendix A provides a
detailed description of the measurement of each and Appendix B, Table B1 provides summary
statistics. We include 13 firm-specific control variables found to be significant in four influential
studies (Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; and Hong and
Kacperczyk, 2009). These control variables include firm size, market-to-book ratio, dividend
yield, debt-to-equity ratio, the inverse of price, share turnover, price impact as a measure of
liquidity, stock market beta, past return volatility, past average firm return, firm age, inclusion of
the firm in the S&P 500 index, and whether the firm is listed on Nasdaq. The firm-specific control
variables except firm age are measured with a one-year lag. Firm age and the two index indicator
variables are measured contemporaneously. Including the control variables mitigates concerns
that an observed association between βind and institutional ownership can be attributed to a

11

Institutions are required to report holdings in any equity security traded on an exchange including the Nasdaq in a
quarterly 13F filing. The only exceptions are that holdings under $20,000 may be excluded and that institutions that
exercise investment discretion over less than $100 million in equity are not required to file a Form 13F.
13

correlation between industry exposure and a broad asset class, such as small or large cap, value or
growth, on which institutions are known to base portfolio allocation decisions (Barberis and
Shleifer, 2003).
The model also includes two proxies for investors’ expectations about the future prospects
of an industry. The first proxy is annual industry returns over the 12 months prior to each year
end (January through December) based on the well-documented phenomenon of industry
momentum (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). The second proxy for investors’ expectations about
future prospects is annual industry returns over the following calendar year, which assumes perfect
foresight.
For the portfolio tilting tests, we measure whether institutional investors tilt their portfolios
toward pure play stocks by comparing the percentage of an institution’s holdings to the weight
implied by a value-weighted investment strategy within an industry that reflects no preference for
industry exposure (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). For each institution j, we compute the weight of
its holdings in stocks of each exposure type e (i.e., high, medium or low) within each industry i
for each year y:
S

PHELDijye   MVijys
s 1

F

 MV
f 1

f
ijy

.

(4)

The numerator is the market value of institution j’s holdings of stocks in industry i with exposure
level e in year y, where S is the number of stocks in industry i of type e within the institution’s
portfolio. The denominator is the market value of institution j’s total holdings of stocks in industry
i in year y, where F is the number of stocks in industry i within the institution’s portfolio. We
compute the weight for each institution at the end of December for each year between 1984 and
2006.
14

We compute the benchmark weight (w) for each industry i in each year y as the valueweighted percentage of stocks classified as having high, medium, or low industry exposure (e):
G

w   MV
e
iy

g
iy

g 1

N

 MV
n 1

n
iy

(5)

where G is the number of firms in industry i in year y with industry exposure level e, and N is the
total number of firms in industry i in year y. The excess weight in each exposure category
(XSBETA) equals the percentage held in each exposure category minus the benchmark weight:

XSBETAijye  PHELDijye  wiye .

(6)

XSBETA measures whether, conditional on investing in a particular industry, an institutional
investor overweights or underweights stocks with industry exposure level e relative to a simple
strategy of investing in a value-weighted industry index.
The excess weights across the three industry exposure categories (i.e., high, medium, and
low) for each institution-industry-year observation sum to zero. We expect that institutional
investors that show preferences for pure play stocks will overweight high exposure stocks
e

(XSBETA ify > 0). The null hypothesis that institutions do not overweight (underweight) high (low)
e
exposure stocks is XSBETAijy  0.

4.2 Empirical results
Table 2 Panel A presents the institutional ownership tests. We report the average of the
annual coefficient estimates from eqn. (3). Significance levels are based on a test statistic
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computed from the annual t-statistics that considers serial correlation.12 The coefficient estimates
for the control variables are consistent with prior research. The number of institutional investors
holding a stock is positively associated with firm size, the inverse of price, share turnover, stock
market beta, past firm and industry returns, firm age, and inclusion in the S&P 500 index, and
negatively associated with the market-to-book ratio, dividend yield, debt-to-equity ratio, price
impact, and listing on Nasdaq.
Our main finding is a positive and statistically significant association between industry
exposure and the number of institutions holding a firm’s stock after controlling for other firm
characteristics. A stock with no industry exposure would experience 23% fewer institutional
investors than a stock with an industry exposure of one, ceteris paribus (column 1). Using the
indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW to measure industry exposure, the coefficient
estimates indicate that the positive association between βind and the number of institutional
investors comes from both investments in pure play stocks and aversions to low exposure stocks
relative to firms with medium levels of industry exposure. A change in a firm’s industry exposure
from the 30th percentile (low exposure stock) to the 70th percentile (high exposure stock) is
associated with a 35% increase in the number of institutional owners.
Panel B presents the portfolio tilting results. The average annual value of XS_BETAHIGH
is 0.0138, which indicates that institutions overweight high exposure stocks by 138 bps relative to

12

Z t

N  1  t  where tj is the t-statistic for year j, N is the number of years, and t

and  (t ) are the mean and

standard deviation, respectively, of the N realizations of tj. Z has a t distribution with N−1 degrees of freedom.
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their weights in a value-weighted industry portfolio. Institutions underweight low-exposure stocks
by 142 bps. The over and underweighting are both significantly different from zero.13

4.3 Robustness tests
Table 3 reports sensitivity analysis of the results to several alternative measures of industry
exposure. For ease of comparison, column (1) repeats the results from Table 2. Panel A reports
results using the alternative continuous measures of industry exposure and Panel B reports results
using their indicator variable counterparts.

All models include the control variables.

The

estimated coefficients for the control variables are consistent with the results in Table 2 in terms
of sign, magnitude, and significance and are not reported.
The first alternative measure is the absolute value of industry exposure. The coefficient
estimate on the absolute value of βind is positive and statistically significant and the results for
BETAHIGH and BETALOW also are robust to this alternative measure of industry exposure.14
In columns 3 through 5 we report coefficient estimates on the exposure proxies from
models using three alternative measures of βind, all of which are derived from estimation of
augmented versions of eqn. (1). The model adjustments are: a) including the Fama-French (1993)
factors (SMB and HML); b) using value-weighted market and industry returns instead of equallyweighted market and industry returns; and c) using monthly data over a five-year period rather

13

Results for the full sample in Panels A and B are not sensitive to the exclusion of stocks classified in the financial
services industry.
14
This finding sheds light on the rationales for preferences for pure play stocks. Incentives to beat performance
benchmarks suggest stronger preferences for high positive exposure stocks because many funds have constraints on
short positions. In contrast, learning models suggest greater preferences for either extreme positive or negative
exposure because signal precision is increased in both cases. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate on |βind| in
column (2) is smaller than the coefficient on βind in column (1), consistent with contracting arrangements, in particular
constraints on short positions, dampening preferences for negative exposure stocks. To further explore this possibility,
we restricted the sample to those stocks with negative industry exposures (n=577). In this sub-sample, the association
between LNUMINST and | βind | is negative and significant (untabulated).
17

than daily data over a one-year period. The results using the alternative measures are qualitatively
similar to those presented in Table 2.15
The next set of robustness tests estimates exposure preferences within characteristic-sorted
portfolios of firms. The analysis is intended to address concerns about omitted correlated
variables. We regress institutional ownership on exposure within portfolios sorted based on
proxies for firm-specific risk (Panel A), financial reporting transparency (Panel B), liquidity (Panel
C), and firm size (Panel D).16 These four firm characteristics are potentially correlated with both
industry exposure (βind) and institutional investments. If the results hold within the portfolios of
firms with similar levels of the characteristic, then correlations between exposure and these four
characteristics do not fully explain our results.
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from the model of the number of institutions
holding a stock [eqn. (3)] within portfolios sorted based on firm-specific risk (FIRMRISK). We
measure FIRMRISK as the standard deviation of the residuals from the extended market model in
eqn. (1) that controls for both market and industry risk. Firms in the bottom (middle two) {upper}
quartile in year y are in the low (middle) {high} FIRMRISK portfolio.17 Coefficient estimates for
the control variables are not tabulated. Industry exposure (βind) remains positively associated with
the number of institutional investors within all three FIRMRISK portfolios (column 1). The results
using the indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW show that high industry-exposure stocks

15

Appendix C and Table C1 describe a set of additional alternative specifications using seven macro-economic risk
factors.
16
The models presented in Table 2 provide controls for the main effects of three of the four characteristics: risk as
measured by return volatility (RETVOL), liquidity as measured by price impact (PRICEIMPACT), and firm size as
measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LOGSIZE_MVE). In results not reported, we also
add the variable FIRMRISK to the models in Table 2. The coefficient on FIRMRISK is negative and significant, but
the coefficient on industry exposure does not change.
17
The estimated coefficients for the control variables are consistent with the results in Table 2 in terms of sign,
magnitude, and significance and are not reported.
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experience more institutional investors than low industry-exposure stocks across all three
FIRMRISK portfolios. The association, however, is lower in magnitude and less frequently
significant in the annual regressions for firms in the upper quartile of firm risk. Given that
FIRMRISK is negatively correlated with firm size, one possible explanation for the dampened
results in the high FIRMRISK portfolio is that institutions invest in small firms because of their
size and not their industry exposure. Consistent with this explanation, the 16 years that are
significant are primarily in the later part of the sample period when institutional investors shifted
their investments toward smaller firms (Blume and Keim, 2014).18 We consider the potential
effect of size on our inferences in Panel D, discussed below.
Table 4 Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from eqn. (3) within portfolios sorted
based on financial reporting transparency. This analysis is motivated by concerns that single
segment firms, which are more likely to have high industry exposure, also have greater financial
reporting transparency, which investors value.19 We sort firms into quartiles based on line-ofbusiness diversification as a proxy for financial reporting transparency.

Line-of-business

diversification (DIVERSIFICATION) is measured as one minus the firm’s revenue-based
concentration ratio, as defined in Appendix A. The minimum value of DIVERSIFICATION is zero
for a single-segment firm, which is presumed to be the most transparent. The value approaches
one as diversification increases (i.e., financial reporting transparency decreases). Firms in the
bottom (middle two) {upper} quartile in year y are in the low (middle) {high} DIVERSIFICATION

The correlation between FIRMRISK and size is –52% in the full panel. The highest (lowest) correlation is -65.6%
in 1992 (-41.5% in 1999). The 16 significant years are 1985, 1990-1992, and 1995-2006.
19
For evidence on investor attraction to transparency in general, see for example Bartov and Bodnar (1996), Boone
and Raman (2001), and Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004). For evidence on attraction to transparency
by institutional investors in particular, see Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) and Bushee and Noe (2000). For evidence
that firms that operate in fewer lines of business, and hence are likely to have greater industry exposure, produce
financial statements with greater information precision (i.e., transparency) about firm value, see Baldwin (1984) and
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004).
19
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portfolio. Across all three characteristic sorted portfolios, institutions exhibit robust clientele
effects for pure play stocks based on both the continuous measure of exposure (βind) and the
indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW.
Table 4 Panel C reports the coefficient estimates within portfolios sorted based on liquidity.
We proxy for the liquidity of a firm’s stock using the Amihud (2002) price impact measure
(PRICEIMPACT), computed as the average daily price impact of trades during each year y:
PRICEIMPAC Tiy 

1 T ri ,t
,

T t 1 Vol i ,t

where ri,t denotes the returns for firm i on day t excluding dividends and Voli,t denotes the number
of shares of firm i traded on day t. Days on which no trades are made are excluded from the
calculations. The smaller the price impact, the more liquid is the stock. Following Amihud (2002),
we normalize the measure by dividing by the mean value of the Amihud measure across stocks in
each year. Some extreme values remain and we winsorize the normalized measure at the 99th
percentile.
Firms in the bottom (middle two) {upper} quartile of PRICEIMPACT in year y are
classified in the high (medium) {low} liquidity portfolio. The coefficient estimate for βind remains
positive and statistically significant within the medium and low liquidity-sorted portfolios. The
magnitudes are dampened and the number of significant annual estimates is lower than for the full
panel. The weaker results could reflect less power because of a smaller number of observations
or could reflect a correlation between liquidity and exposure. While the estimates are weaker,
industry exposure nonetheless still exhibits a statistically significant incremental impact on
institutional ownership for low and medium liquidity stocks. However, in the high-liquidity
portfolio, the magnitude of the relation between exposure and institutional ownership is only
20

0.0165 (and not statistically different from zero). The results using the indicator variables
BETAHIGH and BETALOW also suggest that institutions' investments in pure play stocks are
weakest in high-liquidity stocks.

The difference between the BETAHIGH and BETALOW

coefficient estimates in the high liquidity portfolio (bottom PRICEIMPACT portfolio) is only
0.0252, and the individual annual differences are only significant in seven of the 23 annual model
estimations.
The dampened results in the high-liquidity portfolio may again (as in Panel A) suggest that
firm size is an omitted correlated variable in the analysis. The high-liquidity stocks are large firms
(average market cap of $7.2 billion and 39.5% of the firms are in the S&P 500), which will be part
of most institutional stock portfolios regardless of industry exposure. In the lowest liquidity
quartile, firms have an average market capitalization of $75 million and less than 0.1% are in the
S&P 500. In the full panel, the correlation between firm size and PRICEIMPACT is -0.358 (i.e.,
higher liquidity). Given that LIQUIDITY is positively correlated with firm size, one possible
explanation for the dampened results in the high LIQUIDITY portfolio is that institutions invest in
large firms because of their size and not their industry exposure. Consistent with this explanation,
the seven years that are significant are primarily in the earlier part of the sample period when
institutional investors demonstrated preferences for larger firms (Blume and Keim, 2014).20
In light of the indications of time-varying size effects in Panels A and C that could
confound interpretation of the results, we also conduct portfolio sorts based on size even though
the main model controls for a linear association between log size and institutional ownership.
Table 4 Panel D reports the coefficient estimates within three size portfolios. Firms in the bottom
(middle two) {upper} quartile of firm size measured by market capitalization are in the small

20

The seven years are 1985, 1988-1989, 1991, 1993-1994, and 2003.
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(medium) {large} firm portfolio.

Across all three firm size portfolios, institutions exhibit

preferences for pure play stocks based on both the continuous measure of exposure (βind) and the
indicator variables BETAHIGH and BETALOW. Untabulated results do not show a time trend in
the significance of the coefficient estimates across the size-sorted portfolios.
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that four plausible omitted correlated
variables are not driving our results. The results in Panels A, C, and D, do however suggest that
institutions exhibit size preferences although these preferences do not fully explain our results. To
further alleviate concerns about firm size effects, we estimate the main model using a cubic
specification of firm size (untabulated) based on the findings of Blume and Keim (2014). Our
main finding that institutions invest in pure play stocks remains.21 We also estimate our main
regression within portfolios of small cap, mid-cap, large cap, and mega cap firms as defined in
Blume and Keim (2014). Our results are robust across all four size-based portfolios.

5. Evidence on liquidity in pure play stocks
As noted in the introduction, the salient factor in a firm’s risk management decision is not
institutional ownership per se but the economic benefit that the institutional ownership provides.
A common characterization is that institutions primarily provide either monitoring or
trading/liquidity benefits (e.g., Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). In this section, we examine measures
of liquidity to assess the potential economic magnitude of the benefits to a firm from remaining
exposed to the underlying industry factor. We measure liquidity associated with industry exposure
in an OLS regression model that controls for determinants identified in prior literature. We use

The coefficient estimate on βind, the continuous measure of exposure, in this specification is 0.23. The difference
between the coefficient estimates on the BETAHIGH and BETALOW binary variables is 0.35.
22
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two proxies for liquidity. Share turnover (TURNOVER) is the natural logarithm of average
monthly turnover (volume divided by shares outstanding), computed for each firm i in each year
y. We also use the Amihud (2002) price impact measure (PRICEIMPACT), defined previously,
given criticisms of turnover and spread measures of liquidity (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka,
2009). The model includes all of the control variables included in eqn. (3) with the exception of
TURNOVER and PRICEIMPACT.
Table 5 reports the results. Column (1) shows a strong positive association between
industry exposure and turnover. Ceteris paribus, turnover in firms with high industry exposure is
45% higher than in firms with medium levels of exposure, while turnover in low exposure firms
is 29% lower than for medium exposure firms. These results are not changed when we measure
industry exposure using BETAHIGH and BETALOW in column 2.22 Using the natural logarithm
of Amihud’s measure of price impact as a proxy for liquidity produces similar results in columns
3 and 4. Price impact is significantly and negatively related to industry exposure. The price impact
for firms with high exposure is 47% lower than the price impact for firms with medium exposure,
while the price impact for low exposure firms is 60% greater than the price impact for firms with
medium exposure.

6. Evidence on investments in pure play stocks across time, industries and institution types
In this section, we characterize variation in institutions’ investments in pure play stocks
across time (Section 6.1), industry (Section 6.2), and institution type (Section 6.3).

22

The turnover results are not sensitive to excluding Nasdaq firms.
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6.1 Time variation
In Table 6, we condition the preferences for industry exposure on the favorableness of
recent industry news. As noted in Section 2, we expect the pressure to beat a benchmark and to
invest based on acquired information are greater when the stock has positive momentum. In
column (1), we augment the model of institutional ownership to include interaction terms between
the continuous industry exposure measure (βind) and indicator variables that denote if past industry
returns are high (HIGHPASTIND) or low (LOWPASTIND), defined as above (below) the 75th (25th)
percentile of annual returns within the industry. The models include all of the control variables,
but we only tabulate the coefficient estimates for the main effect of PASTINDRET. During periods
with favorable news about an industry, institutions’ investments in pure play stocks are
significantly more pronounced than those during periods with neutral news about an industry
(annual returns in the 25th – 75th percentiles). The reverse is true during periods of unfavorable
news.
In column (2) the interaction terms are the products of the indicator variables for industry
exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW) and the continuous measure of past industry returns
(PASTINDRET). After controlling for the main effect of past industry returns, the coefficient on
the interaction of BETALOW with past industry returns is significantly negative, while the
coefficient on the interaction of BETAHIGH with PASTINDRET is significantly positive. Similar
to the inferences from column (1), investments in pure play stocks and aversion to low exposure
stocks are amplified following favorable news.
In Panel B, we report the results of the institution-level tests of portfolio tilting conditioning
on past industry returns. During years of favorable past performance, institutions overweight pure
play stocks by 258 bps compared to 157 bps in industries with low past returns.
24

6.2 Industry variation
We examine institutions’ investments in pure play stocks across industries characterized
based on homogeneity. Industry homogeneity is measured as the average annual difference
between the adjusted R2 values of two models for each industry-year: a standard market model and
the extended market model in eqn. (1), each estimated using panel daily return data for the firms
in industry i during calendar year y. The greater the average difference in adjusted R2s, the greater
is the industry homogeneity (HOMOGENEITY).23
Figure 1 presents box plots of the industry homogeneity metric over our sample period
from 1984 through 2006 for each of the 30 Fama-French industries. Five industries stand out as
having substantially higher industry homogeneity: coal, tobacco, utilities, mining, and crude oil
and natural gas. We designate these five industries as high homogeneity industries. For the high
homogeneity industries, on average, the adjusted R2 in the extended market model is 12% higher
in absolute terms than the adjusted R2 in the standard market model. We designate the five
industries with the lowest average homogeneity as low homogeneity industries: wholesale,
services, games, fabricated products, and electrical equipment.24 The adjusted R2 for the low
homogeneity industries increases by just 0.6% in absolute terms. The remaining industries are
classified as medium-homogeneity.25

23

We also measure industry homogeneity as the incremental power of the industry factor relative to the market factor
(F-statistic). The measures based on both methods are highly correlated and our results are similar with both measures.
24
We include five industries in the low homogeneity sample to match the number of industries that stand out as high
homogeneity industries.
25
Our classification of industries as high, medium, or low homogeneity does not change over the sample period.
Figure 1 illustrates variation in homogeneity during the sample period for many industries, however, much of this
variation is due to an increasing trend in industry homogeneity from 1984 through 2006 across all industries. The
relative ranking of the industries remains stable throughout the sample period. The only exception is the homogeneity
measure for the coal industry, which has a small number of firms. All results are robust to exclusion of the coal
industry observations from the regressions.
25

We expect institutions' preferences to be more pronounced in more homogeneous
industries for two reasons. First, these industries are the most common targets of sector funds,26
and sector funds are the most likely to have an industry-based performance benchmark. Second,
institutions are more likely to attempt to acquire an information advantage in these industries by
learning about the common industry risk factor because the underlying industry exposure more
easily maps into the firm’s stock performance (Jin and Jorion, 2006).
Table 7 presents the results conditioning on industry homogeneity.

On average,

institutions’ investments in pure play stocks are increasing in industry homogeneity (Panel A).
Based on estimates for our continuous measure of industry exposure, a stock with zero industry
exposure in a high homogeneity industry will have 28% fewer institutional investors than a stock
with industry exposure equal to one, ceteris paribus. In contrast, the difference is only 18% for
stocks in low homogeneity industries. Using the indicator variables for high and low industryexposure we find that in high and medium-homogeneity industries, a change in a firm’s industry
exposure from the 30th percentile to the 70th percentile is associated with a 36% increase in the
number of institutions holding the stock, compared to just 23% in low homogeneity industries.
The portfolio tilting tests provide even more pronounced evidence that preferences for
exposure increase with industry homogeneity (Table 7 Panel B). Institutions overweight pure play
stocks in high homogeneity industries by 388 bps and underweight low-exposure stocks by 601
bps.

In medium-homogeneity industries the overweightings (underweightings) are less

pronounced at 139 bps (105 bps), and in low homogeneity industries, institutions do not
significantly overweight (underweight) high- (low-) exposure stocks.
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The industries that we designate as high homogeneity also are the industries in which Exchange-Traded Funds
(ETFs) are concentrated (Lipper, 2005).
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6.3 Institutional type variation
We classify institutional investors in two ways. First, we use the classification system in
the Thomson Financial database based on 13F filings, which is used in numerous prior studies of
institutional ownership: (1) bank trusts, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies, (4)
investment advisors, and (5) other. The “other” category includes pension and endowment funds.27
We aggregate the investment companies and investment advisors into one institution type.28
Second, we use the Bushee (1998) classifications of institutional investors based on observed
trading activity. Bushee (1998) identifies three types of institutional investors: Dedicated owners,
quasi-indexers, and transient investors.29 Dedicated owners have large, long-term holdings,
concentrated in a small number of firms, and are more likely to gather private information about a
firm and directly monitor its managers. Quasi-indexers tend not to rely heavily on private
information and adopt a passive monitoring style. Transient investors hold small stakes in many
firms and trade frequently on publicly available information, but they do not generally acquire
private information.
Table 8 reports results for institutional groupings based on 13F filings. All models of
institutional ownership include the same set of control variables as in the previous analyses; results

27

Thomson Financial reports that there is a coding error in the 13F database. Partway through 1998, and in subsequent
years, many banks (Type 1) and independent investment advisors (Type 4) are misclassified as other institutions (Type
5). Bushee’s data at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html provides a consistent classification of
the institutions.
28
We combine the investment companies and investment advisors because Thomson Financial indicates that the
Investment Company category (Type 3) includes investment advisors for which a “significant” portion of their
advisory services are to the mutual fund business.
29
The Bushee (1998) annual institution classifications are based on k-means clustering of standardized factor scores,
which are created on an institution-year basis using the weighted average of firm-specific characteristics of an
institution’s portfolio holdings. Approximately 4% of institution-year observations are dedicated owners, 60% are
quasi-indexers, and 36% are transient investors.
27

for the control variables are consistent with those reported in terms of magnitude, sign and
significance, and are not tabulated. Panel A shows that all types of institutions display a significant
attraction to high industry exposure stocks and a significant aversion to low exposure stocks. The
association between institutional ownership and pure play stocks is strongest for investment
advisors using both the continuous exposure measure and the indicator variables (columns 3 and
7).
Panel B reports institutional ownership results across the high and low homogeneity
industries.

In both groups, all institution types exhibit significant preferences for industry

exposure, with uniformly stronger preferences for stocks in high homogeneity industries. Panel C
reports the portfolio tilting results. All institutions other than banks tilt toward high exposure
stocks and away from low exposure stocks. As in the institutional ownership tests in Panel B, the
preferences for industry exposure are uniformly stronger in high homogeneity industries. Only
investment advisors exhibit preferences for pure play stocks in low homogeneity industries. The
banks are an exception, possibly because of their fiduciary status under the prudent man standard
and the prudent investor rule (Del Guercio, 1996; Hankins, Flannery, and Nimalendran, 2008).
Table 9 reports results for institutional groupings based on observed trading activity
(Bushee, 1998). All three categories show a positive association between institutional investors
and exposure, and the association is driven by both an aversion to low industry exposure stocks
and an attraction to high exposure stocks (Panel A). Using both the continuous measure of
exposure (columns 1 - 3) and the indicator variables (columns 4 - 6), the investments in pure play
stocks are strongest for transient investors followed by quasi-indexers and dedicated owners.
The averaging of the annual coefficient estimates across the 1984 to 2006 sample period
obscures a time trend in the significance of the BETAHIGH coefficient estimate for transient
28

investors and quasi-indexers. The coefficients are not statistically different from zero in the 1980’s
and early 1990’s, but they are consistently significantly positive in the last ten years of the sample
period. This increased investment in pure play stocks by transient investors coincides with the
introduction and rapid growth of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). In 1993 the first ETF was traded
on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). The number of funds grew from one in 1993 to 359
by the end of 2006, and the assets invested in ETFs grew from approximately $1 billion to $422
billion.30 ETFs are designed to track returns in particular sectors or markets, providing investors
with access to sector or market exposure at a lower cost than more traditional mutual funds. A
cost effective way for ETFs to track returns in a particular sector, such as utilities, is to invest in
the stocks of firms that have high industry exposure. ETFs typically hold a large number of stocks,
so they are likely to be classified as either transient or quasi-index investors. The rapid growth in
ETFs may, at least in part, explain the increased investment in pure play stocks among transient
and quasi-index investors over the last decade.
Table 9 Panel B reports the results for institutional groupings across high and low
homogeneity industries. In high homogeneity industries, all institutions invest in pure play stocks
and avoid low industry exposure stocks. Similar to the patterns in investment across institutions
observed in Panel A, preferences in the high homogeneity industries are strongest for transient
investors followed by quasi-indexers and dedicated owners. In low homogeneity industries, there
is limited evidence of aversion to low exposure stocks and no evidence of preferences for high
exposure stocks. Portfolio titling tests in Panel C show that both dedicated owners and transient
investors overweight (underweight) pure play (low exposure) stocks in the sample of all industries.
The excess weightings, however, are only economically meaningful for the transient investors.

30

The source of the annual statistics is the Investment Company Institute (ICI) Fact Book, 2008.
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Moreover, the transient investors’ excess weightings are strongest in the high homogeneity
industries relative to the low homogeneity industries. Dedicated owners overweight high exposure
stocks, regardless of industry.

7. Conclusion
We document that institutions exhibit preferences for pure play stocks, defined as stocks
with high exposure to the firm’s industry factor. The number of institutional investors holding a
firm’s stock is increasing in a firm’s level of industry exposure and institutional investors
overweight (underweight) high (low) industry-exposure stocks in their portfolios. Institutional
investments in pure play stocks are more pronounced during times of favorable industry news and
in homogeneous industries that have greater intra-industry exposure to a common factor.
Preferences for pure play stocks are reflected in investment choices by all types of institutions, but
they are concentrated in institutions generally considered to be liquidity providers. Consistent
with this concentration, we observe greater liquidity in pure play stocks as measured by share
turnover and price impact.
Documenting these patterns is a first step in the process of studying whether and when
firms might adjust their risk management practices to cater to investor preferences. Our evidence
broadly suggests that a firm’s hedging decision should weigh the potential liquidity benefits gained
by not hedging against the benefits of variability reduction, which conventional models attribute
to hedging. Our cross-sectional evidence on when and where the potential liquidty benefits are
expected to be strongest is important to guide future work that attempts to explain firms’ risk
management decisions.
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Figure 1: Industry homogeneity
To measure industry homogeneity for industry j in year y, we estimate a standard market model and an extended market model that
includes an industry factor for each firm i within industry j. We use daily return data over the period January to December of year y.
The extended market model includes the appropriate equally-weighted industry returns and the equally-weighted market returns. For
each firm i in year y, we compute the difference between the adjusted R2 values of the two models. We use the average difference in
adjusted R2 values within an industry as our measure of industry homogeneity. The box plot below summarizes the industry
homogeneity across our sample period of 1984 – 2006.

34

Table 1. Summary of industry exposure by industry
Column (1) presents the industry mean of the firm-specific estimates of the monthly industry factor
betas (βind) and column (2) presents the intra-industry standard deviation of βind. In column (3),
δind is the estimated industry factor exposure in year y+1 for a portfolio that buys high-industryexposure firms and shorts low-industry-exposure firms. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the
0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level based on robust standard errors.
Industry
Electrical Equipment
Telecommunications
Games
Wholesale
Household
Books
Meals
Smoke
Coal
Construction
Transportation
Beer
Carry
Chemicals
Autos
Food
Clothes
Textiles
Paper
Services
Steel
Fabricated Products
Financial
Health
Retail
Mines
Oil
Business Equipment
Utilities

No. of firm-year
obs. in industry
1,465
2,494
2,660
4,359
2,082
1,394
1,890
123
145
3,542
2,645
310
680
1,730
1,403
2,242
1,499
685
1,990
11,597
1,559
4,330
23,262
9,739
5,343
1,569
4,113
13,656
3,658
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(1)
Industry mean of
βind
0.5232
0.5312
0.5720
0.5802
0.5887
0.6304
0.6433
0.6439
0.6452
0.6501
0.6578
0.6636
0.6771
0.6905
0.6913
0.7060
0.7097
0.7160
0.7358
0.7686
0.7696
0.7864
0.8395
0.8531
0.8588
0.8859
0.9055
0.9301
0.9349

(2)
Intra-industry
std dev of βind
1.2628
1.0324
1.2353
1.6622
1.2395
1.1722
1.1710
0.8429
0.7907
1.3512
1.0351
1.1015
1.0209
1.0482
1.0697
1.3223
1.3554
0.9776
1.1544
2.0116
0.8655
1.5607
1.5710
1.4970
1.3229
0.8476
0.8754
1.8013
0.7023

(3)
δind
0.3295
0.3510***
0.5536***
0.1986
0.6009***
0.1146
0.2732**
0.2558**
0.4228***
0.6607***
0.7340***
0.7095***
0.4214**
0.4060***
0.4046***
0.4384***
0.2600**
0.8104**
0.5441***
0.8482***
0.6450***
0.6008***
0.4566***
0.6866***
0.4191***
0.6104***
0.5102***
0.8376***
0.7991***

Table 2. Industry exposure and institutional ownership
Panel A presents average annual coefficient estimates from a regression of institutional ownership on industry factor
price exposure and firm, stock, and industry characteristics. Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of
one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST). Industry exposure is measured
using the continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure
is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles for each industry
are recalculated for each calendar year. Firm-specific control variables measured at or for the year ended y-1 are the
natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LOGSIZE_MVE), the inverse price ratio (INVPRICE), the natural
logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (LOGMB), dividend yield (DIVYLD), debt equity ratio (DERATIO), turnover
(TURNOVER), price impact as a measure of liquidity (PRICEIMPACT), stock return volatility (RETVOL), and
average monthly firm returns (LAGFIRMRET). Control variables measured at or for the year ended y are stock market
beta (MKTBETA2), firm age (FIRMAGE), and indicator variables for S&P 500 stocks (S&P500) and Nasdaq-listed
stocks (NASDAQ). The models include industry returns over the calendar year y-1 (PASTINDRET) and year y+1
(FUTINDRET). Appendix A provides variable definitions. Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006.
Panel B presents the average annual excess weight placed on high- and low-exposure stocks in institutional investor
portfolios over the period from 1984 to 2006. The excess weights (XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW) are calculated
relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within each
industry each year. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic
computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.
Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors
(1)
Intercept
LOGSIZE_MVE
INVPRICE
LOGMB
DIVYLD
DERATIO
TURNOVER
PRICEIMPACT
RETVOL
MKTBETA2
LAGFIRMRET
FIRMAGE
S&P500
NASDAQ
PASTINDRET
FUTINDRET

βind

0.8341***
0.3824***
0.2380***
-0.0786***
-0.7692*
-0.0117***
0.1242***
-0.2155***
-1.6380
0.1652***
1.1286***
0.1936***
0.6122***
-0.2376***
0.1800***
-0.0384

-0.2180***
0.1349***
0.3529
22 /23 years
2,651
76.07%

Panel B: Institution-level tests of excess portfolio weights
XS-BETALOW
XS-BETAHIGH

1.0601***
0.3908***
0.2452***
-0.0833***
-0.7738**
-0.0078***
0.1369***
-0.2228***
-0.8007
0.0610***
1.2270***
0.1891***
0.5856***
-0.2444***
0.2016***
-0.0242

0.2276***

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years significant:
Average annual number of observations
Average annual Adjusted R2

(2)

-0.0142***
0.0138***
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2,651
75.69%

Table 3. Sensitivity of models of institutional ownership to alternative measures of industry exposure
Average annual coefficient estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on industry factor price exposure
and firm, stock, and industry characteristics, estimated using alternative measures of industry exposure. Panel A (B)
present results for the continuous (discrete) measures of industry exposure. Institutional ownership is measured as the
natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST). In column (1),
we present the results from Table 2 using βind as the proxy for industry exposure for convenient comparison. Column
(2) presents results using the absolute value of βind. In columns (3) through (5), βind is derived using an alternative
factor price model. The top rows of the table indicate the model specification including the weighting for the returns,
the factors included, and the frequency of the data. All models include control variables described in Table 2 and
defined in Appendix A. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not tabulated. Models are estimated
annually from 1984 through 2006. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test
statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.
Panel A: Firm-level tests using continuous measures of industry exposure

Alternative measure of industry exposure
Benchmark
model from
Table 2

(1)

βind
|βind|
Control variables
Avg # annual obs
Avg ann Adj R2

Industry
exposure =
|βind |

(2)

0.2276***

βind from

βind from eqn

βind from eqn

market model
that includes
Fama-French
factors

(1) estimated
monthly

(3)

(1) estimated
with valueweighted
industry and
market returns
(4)

0.1517***

0.2848***

YES

YES

YES

2,651
75.61%

2,434
84.13%

2,651
75.32%

(5)
0.1046***

0.0674***
YES
2,651
76.07%

YES
2,651
75.27%

Panel B: Firm-level tests using indicator variables for industry exposure
BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
Control variables

-0.2180***
0.1349***
0.3529

-0.1040***
0.0548***
0.1588

-0.2003***
0.0895***
0.2898

-0.1700***
0.1354***
0.3054

-0.1287***
0.0166
0.1453

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES
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Table 4. Exploration of alternative explanations for institutional ownership in industry exposure
Average annual coefficient estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on industry factor price exposure and
firm, stock, and industry characteristics. The models are estimated separately within characteristic-sorted portfolios based
on firm-specific risk (Panel A), financial reporting transparency (Panel B), liquidity (Panel C), and firm size (Panel D).
Firm-specific risk is measured as the residual standard deviation from the extended market model in eqn (1). Transparency
is measured as one minus the firm’s revenue-based concentration ratio, computed following Comment and Jarrell (1995).
Liquidity is measured as the Amihud (2002) price impact measure. Firm size is measured as the natural log of the market
value of equity. For each characteristic, firms are ranked into quartiles within industry by year to determine the portfolio.
Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of
year y (LNUMINST). Industry exposure is measured using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor
price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles for each
industry are recalculated for each calendar year. All models include control variables described in Table 2 and defined in
Appendix A (untabulated). Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. *** {**} [*] indicates significance
at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for
serial correlation. The table denotes the number of years in which the annual difference between BETAHIGH and
BETALOW is significant at the 10% level.
Panel A:
By quartiles of firm-specific
risk
Bottom quartile = Lowest firmspecific risk

Panel B:
By quartiles of transparency
Bottom quartile = Least
diversified = Most transparent

Bottom
quartile

βind

0.3421***

0.2336***
-0.1961***
0.1549***
0.3510

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years
significant :

-0.2320***
0.1195***
0.3515

22/23 years

22/23 years

Middle two
quartiles

βind

0.3384***

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years
significant:

0.1418***
-0.2150***
0.2257***
0.4407

-0.1444***
0.0624***
0.2068

23/23 years

11/23 years

Upper
quartile

βind
BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years
significant:

0.1874***

0.1959***
-0.1576***
0.1641***
0.3217

-0.1642***
0.0832***
0.2474

16/23 years

16/23 years
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Panel C:
By quartiles of liquidity
Bottom quartile = Lowest
PRICEIMPACT = Highest
liquidity

Panel D:
By quartiles of size
Bottom quartile = Smallest firm
size

Bottom
quartile

βind

0.1907***

0.0165

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years
significant :

-0.0327
-0.0075
0.0252

***

-0.1832***
0.1250***
0.3082

7/23 years

17/23 years

Middle two
quartiles

βind

0.1414***

0.1813***
***

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years
significant:

-0.1448
0.0941***
0.2389

-0.1545***
0.1192***
0.2737

22/23 years

22/23 years

Upper
quartile

βind
BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years
significant:

0.1185***

0.2387***
***

-0.1155
0.0892***
0.2047

-0.2116***
0.1063***
0.3179

14/23 years

18/23 years
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Table 5. Industry exposure and stock liquidity
Average annual coefficient estimates from models of share turnover and price impact as a function of industry exposure.
Share turnover (TURNOVER) is the natural logarithm of average monthly turnover (volume divided by shares
outstanding) computed for each firm i in each year y. Price impact (PRICEIMPACT) is Amihud’s illiquidity measure
(truncated at 99th percentile). Industry factor price exposure is measured using the continuous variable βind and using
indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile
exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar year. The control
variables are defined in Table 2 and Appendix A. TURNOVER and PRICEIMPACT are excluded as control variables.
Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10]
level, based on a test statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE:

TURNOVER
(1)

Intercept
LOGSIZE_MVE
INVPRICE
LOGMB
DIVYLD
DERATIO
RETVOL
MKTBETA2
LAGFIRMRET
FIRMAGE
S&P500
NASDAQ
PASTINDRET
FUTINDRET
βind
BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years significant
Average annual N
Average annual
Adjusted R2

-4.2454***
0.1305***
-0.1176***
0.0393***
-2.5073***
-0.0203***
8.4648***
0.3809***
2.0138***
-0.0714***
0.2263***
0.2246***
0.0191
-0.1397

(2)
-3.9743***
0.1590***
-0.1097***
0.0330***
-2.7121***
-0.0129***
10.3066***
0.1444***
2.2560***
-0.0851***
0.1719***
0.2053***
0.0474
-0.1125

0.5029***

Log(PRICEIMPACT)
(3)
(4)
2.1285***
-0.9451***
-0.3463***
-0.1075***
-1.4391*
0.0315***
10.4503***
-0.5647***
-7.6994***
-0.1916***
-1.2425***
0.5545***
-0.3664***
0.1451

1.6357***
-0.9870***
-0.3613***
-0.0972***
-1.0937
0.0192***
7.4498***
-0.2154***
-8.0858***
-0.1719***
-1.1523***
0.5716***
-0.4169***
0.0996***

-0.7389***
***

0.6095***
-0.4734***
-1.0829
22/23 years

-0.2878
0.4522***
0.7400
23/23 years
2,666

2,666

2,665

2,665

32.35%

27.59%

75.24%

74.22%
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Table 6. Industry exposure and institutional ownership conditional on past industry returns
Panel A presents average annual coefficient estimates from a regression of institutional ownership on industry factor price
exposure, and firm, stock and industry characteristics. The models include past industry returns interacted with measures
of industry exposure. Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that
hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST). In column (1), industry exposure is measured using the continuous variable
βind. In column (2), industry factor price exposure is measured using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry
factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70 th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles
for each industry are calculated for each calendar year. All models include control variables described in Table 2 and
defined in Appendix A; only estimates for PASTINDRET are tabulated. The model in column (1) includes interaction
terms that are the products of βind and indicator variables for high (low) returns, defined as above (below) the 75th (25th)
percentile of annual returns within the industry. The model in column (2) includes interaction terms that are the product
of the continuous measure of past industry returns (PASTINDRET) and the indicator variables BETAHIGH and
BETALOW. Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. Panel B presents the average annual excess weight
placed on high- and low-exposure stocks in institutional investor portfolios. The averages are measured separately over
periods of high, medium, and low past industry returns. The excess weights (XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW) are
calculated relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within
each industry each year. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic
computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.
Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors conditional on past industry returns
(1)
(2)
PASTINDRET
0.1473***
0.1922***

βind
βind x LOWPASTINDRET
βind x HIGHPASTINDRET

0.2244***
-0.0075
0.0254**
-0.2258***
0.0919***
-0.1148*
0.1450**

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
BETALOW x PASTINDRET
BETAHIGH x PASTINDRET
Average annual number of observations
Average annual Adjusted R2

2,651
76.16%

2,651
75.74%

Panel B: Institution-level tests of excess portfolio weights conditional on past industry returns
Past industry returns
High
-0.0015
0.0258**

XS-BETALOW
XS-BETAHIGH
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Medium
0.0093*
0.0211***

Low
0.0010
0.0157***

Table 7. Cross-sectional variation in institutional ownership based on industry homogeneity
Panel A presents average annual coefficient estimates from regressions of institutional ownership on industry factor price exposure, and firm, stock, and industry
characteristics, estimated separately for three categories of stocks: High, medium, and low homogeneity. Industry homogeneity (HOMOGENEITY) is the difference
between the adjusted R2 values from estimation of a standard market model and an extended market model for each firm i within industry j, estimated using monthly
return data over the period January of year y – 4 to December of year y. The extended market model includes the appropriate equally weighted industry returns
and the equally weighted market returns. Institutional ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end
of year y (LNUMINST). Industry exposure is measured using the continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor
price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th) percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar
year. All models include control variables described in Table 2 and defined in Appendix A. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not tabulated.
Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. Panel B presents the average annual excess weight placed on high- and low-exposure stocks in institutional
investor portfolios averaged over the period from 1984 through 2006. The excess weights (XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW) are calculated relative to the valueweighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within each industry each year. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01
{0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.

(1)
High

βind

0.2794***

Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors
HOMOGENEITY
HOMOGENEITY
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Medium
Low
High
Medium
0.2381***

(6)
Low

0.1809***

BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference

-0.2495***
0.1141***
0.3636

-0.2320***
0.1437***
0.3757

-0.1472***
0.0857***
0.2329

No. of years significant:

18/23 years

23/23 years

16/23 years

263
81.60%

1,850
76.16%

538
70.92%

Average annual N
Average annual Adjusted R2

263
81.69%

1,850
76.61%

538
71.21%

Panel B: Institution-level tests of excess portfolio weights
XS-BETALOW
XS-BETAHIGH

-0.0601**
0.0388***

-0.0105***
0.0139***
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0.0050
-0.0042

Table 8. Cross-sectional variation in institutional investor preferences based on 13F designation
Results for institutions by Thomson 13F designations: banks, insurance companies, investment advisors, and pensions/endowments. Panel A presents average
annual coefficient estimates from multivariate models of institutional ownership as a function of industry exposure. Institutional ownership is measured as the
natural log of one plus the number of institutions of a particular type that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST). Industry exposure is measured using the
continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70 th (30th) percentile exposure
(BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar year. All models include control variables described in Table 2 and
defined in Appendix A (untabulated). Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. The coefficient estimates presented are the averages of the annual
estimates. (*){**}[***] indicate statistical significance at the (10%) {5%} [1%] level. Significance levels are based on a Z-statistic associated with the annual tstatistics (see Table 2). Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the 23 annual regressions. Panel
B presents the results estimated separately for high and low homogeneity industries. Panel C presents the portfolio tilting test results. XS-BETAHIGH and XSBETALOW represent the excess weight calculated relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry exposure, respectively, within
each industry each year. We present the average annual excess weight placed on high and low exposure stocks in institutional investor portfolios over the period
from 1984 to 2006.
Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by Thomson 13F designations
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Insurance
Investment
Pensions/
Banks
Companies
Advisors
Endowments
Banks

ind

0.1697***

0.1929***

0.2133***

(6)
Insurance
Companies

(7)
Investment
Advisors

(8)
Pensions/
Endowments

0.1860***

BETALOW
BETAHIGH

-0.1622***
0.1007***
0.2629

-0.1754***
0.1277***
0.3031

-0.2108***
0.1292***
0.3400

-0.1797***
0.1271***
0.3068

No. of years significant:

22/23 years

22/23 years

23/23 years

22/23 years

2,651
73.31%

2,651
73.10%

Average annual N
Average annual Adjusted R2

2,651
75.32%

2,651
71.12%

2,651
73.64%

2,651
73.37%

2,651
75.03%

2,651
70.69%

Panel B: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by Thomson 13F designations and industry homogeneity
High homogeneity industries
Low homogeneity industries
Insurance
Investment
Pensions/
Insurance
Investment
Pensions/
Banks
Companies
Advisors
Endowments
Banks
Companies
Advisors
Endowments
BETALOW
-0.1866***
-0.2563***
-0.2346***
-0.2475***
-0.0791***
-0.1065***
-0.1626***
-0.1038***
***
***
***
***
BETAHIGH
0.1166
0.1087
0.1389
0.0977
0.0465***
0.0585***
0.0893***
0.0349***
Difference
0.2843
0.3729
0.3433
0.3864
0.1256
0.1650
0.2519
0.1387
# of annual sig differences
(17/23)
(19/23)
(17/23)
(17/23)
(10/23)
(11/23)
(16/23)
(12/23)
Test vs. Banks
(6/23)
(8/23)
(6/23)
(5/23)
(12/23)
(4/23)
Test vs. Insurance companies
(5/23)
(2/23)
(6/23)
(2/23)
Test vs. Investment advisors
(6/23)
(9/23)
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Table 8, continued
Panel C: Institutional-level tests of excess portfolio weights by Thomson 13F designations
All industries
High homogeneity industries
XS-BETAHIGH
XS-BETALOW
XS-BETAHIGH
XS-BETALOW
Banks
-0.0156***
-0.0120***
0.0051
-0.0099
Insurance Companies
0.0098***
-0.0178***
0.0234**
-0.0526***
***
***
***
Investment Advisors
0.0222
-0.0134
0.0491
-0.0721**
***
***
***
Pensions/Endowments
0.0135
-0.0222
0.0487
-0.0885***
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Low homogeneity industries
XS-BETAHIGH
XS-BETALOW
-0.0509***
0.0179
-0.0154***
0.0089
0.0103***
0.0009
-0.0163***
0.0082

Table 9. Cross-sectional variation in institutional investor preferences based on institutional investor style
Results for institutions classified based on the Bushee (1998) trading style classifications: Dedicated owners, quasi-indexers, and transient investors. Panel A
presents average annual coefficient estimates from multivariate models of institutional ownership as a function of industry exposure. Institutional ownership is
measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions of a particular type that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST). Industry exposure is
measured using the continuous variable βind and using indicator variables that equal one if a firm’s industry factor price exposure is greater (less) than the 70th (30th)
percentile exposure (BETAHIGH and BETALOW). Percentiles for each industry are recalculated for each calendar year. All models include control variables
described in Table 2 and defined in Appendix A (untabulated). Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. The coefficient estimates presented are
the averages of the annual estimates. (*){**}[***] indicate statistical significance at the (10%) {5%} [1%] level. Significance levels are based on a Z-statistic
associated with the annual t-statistics (see Table 2). Parenthetical amounts represent the number of annual test statistics that are significant at the 10% level in the
23 annual regressions. Panel B presents the results estimated separately for high and low homogeneity industries. Panel C presents the portfolio tilting test results.
XS-BETAHIGH and XS-BETALOW represent the excess weight calculated relative to the value-weighted percentage of stocks with high and low industry
exposure, respectively, within each industry each year. We present the average annual excess weight placed on high and low exposure stocks in institutional
investor portfolios over the period from 1984 to 2006.
Panel A: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by investment style
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dedicated
Quasi-indexers
Transient
Owners
Investors
βind
0.0747***
0.2042***
0.2526***
BETALOW
BETAHIGH
Difference
No. of years significant:
Average annual N
Average annual Adjusted R2

2,651
61.66%

2,651
75.58%

2,651
72.17%

(4)
Dedicated
Owners

(5)
Quasi-indexers

(6)
Transient
Investors

-0.0895***
0.0385***
0.1280

-0.2031***
0.1152***
0.3183

-0.2216***
0.1752***
0.3968

18/23 years

22/23 years

23/23 years

2,651
61.58%

2,651
75.26%

Panel B: Firm-level tests of the number of institutional investors by investment style and industry homogeneity
High homogeneity industries
Low homogeneity industries
Dedicated
Transient
Dedicated
Owners
Quasi-indexers
Investors
Owners
Quasi-indexers
BETALOW
-0.1059***
-0.1429***
-0.2608***
-0.0099
-0.0466***
**
***
***
***
BETAHIGH
0.0511
0.0696
0.1138
-0.0361
-0.0283
Difference
0.1570
0.2125
0.3746
-0.0262
0.0183
# of annual sig differences
(14/23)
(17/23)
(21/23)
(3/23)
(4/23)
Test vs. Dedicated Owners
(3/23)
(12/23)
(2/23)
Test vs. Quasi-indexers
(13/23)
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2,651
71.64%

Transient
Investors
-0.0350**
-0.0143
0.0207
(4/23)
(4/23)
(4/23)

Table 9, continued
Panel C: Institutional-level tests of excess portfolio weights by investment style
All industries
High homogeneity industries
XS-BETAHIGH
XS-BETALOW
XS-BETAHIGH
XS-BETALOW
Investment Style
Dedicated Owners
0.0087*
0.0076*
0.0220**
-0.0002
Quasi-indexers
-0.0013
-0.0103***
0.0207
-0.0398
Transient Investors
0.0462***
-0.0267***
0.0796***
-0.1138***
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Low homogeneity industries
XS-BETAHIGH
XS-BETALOW
0.0256***
-0.0268***
0.0354***

-0.0011
-0.0143**
-0.0125

Appendix A: Control variable definitions
We draw the control variable constructs for the determinants of institutional ownership from four sources: Del Guercio (1996),
Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). We winsorize all control variables except for firm
age and the indicator variables for inclusion in the S&P 500 index and Nasdaq stocks at the first and 99th percentiles.
Construct
Leverage

Diversification

Dividend yield
Firm-specific risk
Firm age
Future industry stock
return
Inverse of share price
Firm stock return
Market-to-book ratio
Firm size
Systematic risk
Trades on Nasdaq
exchange
Past industry stock
return
Amihud (2002) price
impact
Return volatility
Included in the S&P
500 index

Name
DERATIO

Description
Total long-term debt (including current portion) divided by total common equity at year end.

DIVERSIFICATION


J 
One minus the firm’s revenue-based concentration ratio 1    Rs


s 1 


DIVYLD
FIRMRISK
FIRMAGE

following Comment and Jarrell (1995). The minimum value of DIVERSIFICATION is zero for a
single-segment firm.
Annual dividend per share divided by share price.
Standard deviation of residual from the two-factor extended market model in Eq. (1).
Natural log of the number of months from the CRSP start date to year end.

FUTINDRET

Annual industry stock return over the 12 months (January through December) after each year end.

INVPRICE
LAGFIRMRET
LOGMB
LOGSIZE_MVE
MKTBETA2

RETVOL

Inverse of stock price at year end.
Average monthly return during the year.
Natural log of market value of equity divided by common book equity at year end.
Natural log of the market value of equity (in $ thousands) at year end.
Market beta from estimation of the two-factor extended market model in Eq. (1).
Indicator variable equals one if the firm is traded on the Nasdaq exchange as of year end according
to CRSP, and zero if it is traded on the NYSE/AMEX.
Annual industry stock return over the 12 months (January through December) prior to each year
end.
Average of the daily absolute value of returns scaled by the day’s volume during year y, normalized
by the average PRICEIMPACT of stocks for year y.
Standard deviation of daily firm returns during the year.

S&P500

Indicator variable equals one if the firm is in the S&P 500 index as of year end, and zero otherwise.

NASDAQ
PASTINDRET
PRICEIMPACT
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Appendix B
Table B1. Summary statistics for dependent and control variables
Means and medians of the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock
i at the end of year y (LNUMINST), and regression control variables: the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity (LOGSIZE_MVE), the inverse price ratio (INVPRICE), the
natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (LOGMB), dividend yield (DIVYLD), debt
equity ratio (DERATIO), turnover (TURNOVER), price impact as a measure of liquidity
(PRICEIMPACT), stock return volatility (RETVOL), average monthly firm returns
(LAGFIRMRET), stock market beta (MKTBETA2), firm age (FIRMAGE), and indicator
variables for S&P 500 stocks (S&P500) and Nasdaq-listed stocks (NASDAQ). The means
and medians are for the sample of firms used to estimate eqn. (3) in Table 2 across the
years 1984 - 2006.

Log number of institutional investors
Firm size (Log MV of equity)
Inverse of share price
Log market-to-book ratio
Dividend yield
Leverage (Debt/equity ratio)
Log monthly turnover
Amihud (2002) price impact

Daily return volatility
Systematic risk
Average monthly return
Log firm age in months
S&P 500 index inclusion dummy
Nasdaq firm indicator

LNUMINST
LOGSIZE_MVE
INVPRICE
LOGMB
DIVYLD
DERATIO
TURNOVER
PRICEIMPACT
RETVOL
MKTBETA2
LAGFIRMRET
FIRMAGE
S&P500
NASDAQ
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Mean
3.5616
5.3740
0.1790
0.5218
0.0164
1.1946
-2.9641
0.2875
0.0314
0.2368
0.0142
4.9543
0.1296
0.4848

Median
3.5835
5.2828
0.0620
0.4550
0.0033
0.6433
-2.9235
0.0130
0.0259
0.1969
0.0125
5.0106
0.0000
0.0000

Appendix C: Sensitivity of models of institutional ownership to an alternative

measure of industry exposure conditional on macro-economic risk factor exposure
As an alternative to our primary measure of industry exposure (βind), we generate an
exposure measure using a market model that includes macro-economic risk factors:

rim   iy   iymkt rmkt ,m  iyind rind ,m  7z 1  iyz FACTORzm  im

(C1)

where rmkt and rind are the monthly returns on the appropriate equally weighted market and
industry portfolios, respectively, and FACTORz is one of seven risk factors identified in
prior research:
1. Interest Rates (INT): Calculated as the 3 month treasury bill rate.
2. Default Premium (DEF): Calculated as Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond
Yield – 10 year government bond yield.
3. Term Premium (TERM): Calculated as the yield on 10 year constant maturity
government bonds – the yield on one year constant maturity government bonds.
4. Foreign Exchange Rates (FX): A weighted average of the foreign exchange value
of the U.S. dollar against a subset of the broad index currencies that circulate
widely outside the country of issue.
5. Commodities (COM): We use the Producer Price Index for Commodities
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
6. Small minus Big (SMB): The Fama-French monthly benchmark factor for the
performance of small stocks relative to big stocks.
7. High book-to-market – low book-to-market (HML): The Fama-French monthly
benchmark factor for the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks
(High Minus Low).
We estimate eqn. (C1) for each firm i at the end of each year y from 1984 through 2006
using the past 60 months of monthly return data.
We estimate a version of eqn. (3) – the model of institutional ownership – using
 iyind as the measure of industry exposure, including all control variables with βmkt estimated

in eqn. (C1), and including the macro-risk parameters from eqn. C1 (the z’s). The
coefficients on the control variables are similar to the results reported in Table 2 in terms
of sign, magnitude, and statistical significance and are not reported. Table C1 shows that
industry exposure remains a positive and significant determinant of institutional ownership
at the 1% level in all models.
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Table C1: Industry exposure, factor price exposure, and institutional ownership
Average annual coefficient estimates from models of industry factor price exposure as a determinant of institutional ownership in a firm’s stock. Institutional
ownership is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of institutions that hold stock i at the end of year y (LNUMINST). Industry factor price exposure
is measured using the continuous variable

 ind

estimated in eqn. (C1). The models include the exposure coefficient estimates on seven risk factors: SMB, HML,

INT, TERM, DEF, FX, and COM. Firm-specific control variables measured at or for the year ended y-1 are the natural logarithm of the market value of equity
(LOGSIZE_MVE), the inverse price ratio (INVPRICE), the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio (LOGMB), dividend yield (DIVYLD), debt equity ratio
(DERATIO), turnover (TURNOVER), price impact as a measure of liquidity (PRICEIMPACT) stock return volatility (RETVOL), and average monthly firm returns
(LAGFIRMRET). Control variables measured at or for the year ended y are stock market beta (MKTBETA2), firm age (FIRMAGE), and indicator variables for
S&P 500 stocks (S&P500) and Nasdaq-listed stocks (NASDAQ). The models include industry returns over the calendar year y-1 (PASTINDRET) and year y+1
(FUTINDRET). Models are estimated annually from 1984 through 2006. *** {**} [*] indicates significance at the 0.01 {0.05} [0.10] level, based on a test statistic
computed from the distribution of yearly coefficients, adjusted for serial correlation.

Industry exposure:  ind
Exposure to additional factors:
SMB
HML
INT
DEF
TERM
FX
COM
Control variables
Average annual # of obs
Avg annual Adj-R2

0.1403***

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.1079***

0.1068***

0.1040***

0.1073***

0.1066***

0.1049***

0.1331***

0.0009
-0.0193*
-0.0011
-0.0009
-0.0117*
-0.0097
-0.0025

-0.0049

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

2,434
84.47%

2,434
83.64%

2,434
83.74%

2,434
83.73%

2,434
83.68%

2,434
83.70%

2,434
83.63%

2,434
83.61%

-0.0207**
-0.0046
-0.0006
-0.0047**
-0.0058
-0.0025
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